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I. Introduction 
 
My goal in this essay is to explore some issues having to do with the contrast 
between  “emotion” and  “cognition” and the ways in which these figure in moral 
judgment and decision-making. I begin by sketching a view which I call the Rationalist 
Dichotomy (RD) position. This assumes a sharp dividing line between human “cognitive” 
(rational, conceptual) capacities and capacities labeled as  “emotional” or affective and 
valorizes the former at the expense of the latter. I will then suggest that current 
understanding of how the brain works and of the functions of neural areas commonly 
described as “emotional” undermines the RD position and instead suggests an alternative 
picture, which I will call the Integrative Non-Dichotomy (IND) view.  According to the 
IND view, emotion and cognition are not sharply distinct and emotional processing, 
properly understood, plays (and ought to play, on virtually any plausible normative 
theory, including utilitarianism) a central role in moral judgment. The implications of the 
IND view for the interpretation of various experimental results regarding moral decision-
making and for “rationalist” projects in moral philosophy more generally will then be 
explored.  
   The Rationalist Dichotomy position. The RD view has been very influential, 
both historically and in recent theorizing,  and both among those adopting naturalistic 
approaches to moral judgment (e.g. , Greene et al., 2004) and among those adopting less 
naturalistic and more aprioristic treatments (e.g., Parfit, 2011). The RD view sometimes 
takes a “scientific” form but more commonly (among moral philosophers)  takes a form 
which assumes the superiority of reason but is non-committal about neurobiological and 
evolutionary details. In its “scientific” form RD  is commonly framed in terms of the 
assumption that our reasoning abilities are “modern” in evolutionary terms (perhaps 
unique to human beings), highly sophisticated in terms of  the information processing 
they carry out,  and flexible in terms of their ability to   respond optimally to a wide range  
of circumstances.  By contrast, “emotion” is claimed to be produced by structures that are 
ancient in evolutionary terms  (the product of the “reptilian” part of the triune brain, as 
Paul MacLean (1990) notoriously claimed), “primitive” in terms of the information 
processing they can accomplish, and inflexible and stereotyped in operation, often 
encoding responses that are genetically fixed and relatively unmodifiable.  On this view, 
emotions are sometimes heuristically useful as “alarm bells” that alert us to events in our 
environment that   impinge on our welfare, as when we have a fear response to a snake.  
However, precisely because they are primitive, inflexible and insensitive to many 
relevant considerations, emotions are likely to lead us astray when we need to make 
complex or sophisticated decisions.  Although as noted above, the positions of many 
contemporary moral philosophers differ from the views just described in making no 
specific claims about the neural structures involved in cognitive or emotional processing,  
they nonetheless hold to the basic commitments of the RD position—in particular, its 
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positive  assessment  of the involvement of reasoning in moral decision-making and its 
negative assessment of the effects of emotion. Strikingly, these RD commitments are 
shared both by many philosophers sympathetic to utilitarianism  (Greene, Singer, Parfit) 
and by many philosophers favoring  alternatives to utilitarianism  ( Kamm, 1993,  many 
contemporary neo- Kantians, and,  on many interpretations, Kant himself).  These 
commitments provide one of the main motivations for the adoption of some variety of 
moral rationalism, according to which the source of moral requirements is found in 
“reason”, conceived as something distinct from and independent of “emotion”.   
  The neural structures generally described as involved in “emotional” processing 
include ventro-medial prefrontal cortex, orbital frontal cortex (which I will generally 
classify together as VMPFC/OFC), anterior cingulate cortex (ACC), insula, amygdala, 
and other structures like ventral striatum involved in reward processing.  If we are to 
assess RD claims about the generally negative impact of emotion on moral judgment and 
decision-making, we need to understand what these areas do in the brain. What, if 
anything, do these structures contribute to decision –making, moral and otherwise?  To 
what features of an organism’s environment and/or the organism itself (for example, 
other neural structures) are these structures responsive?   If one were to somehow remove 
their contribution to decision-making, replacing them with contributions commonly 
described as purely cognitive or “reason-based”, what would be the likely upshot?  
Would this lead to normatively better decisions by some plausible standard?   Is it even 
possible for neurotypical subjects to systematically do this?  
  The  Integrative Non-Dichotomist position. In contrast to the RD view, I will 
argue for a very different account of the contribution to judgment and decision-making of 
the  “emotional” structures mentioned above.  On the IND account, which I believe is 
better supported by current brain research, these structures  (and especially structures like 
OFC/VMPFC) engage in complex, sophisticated information processing and 
computation. What they compute are values or rewards associated with distal stimuli and 
with actions directed to those stimuli. The structures under discussion are highly flexible 
and capable of sophisticated forms of learning, particularly in social contexts, which are  
often informationally very complex.  Contrary to what is sometimes thought, these 
structures have not been retained in relatively unmodified form from our non- human 
ancestors. Instead, they have continued to change under the distinctive selection pressures 
to which human beings have exposed, and as a consequence are importantly different, 
both anatomically and functionally, from homologous structures in non-human primates.  
They are used in information-processing tasks that in some respects are importantly 
different from those for which they are used in other animals. The result is that humans 
have emotional responses that differ in important respects from those of other animals, 
including other primates.  
An illustrative example is provided by the human insula.  In non-human mammals 
(e.g. rats), this structure is involved, among other things, in assessment of taste  and food 
intake that is potentially harmful ( generating literal “disgust” reactions), as well as the 
monitoring of interior bodily states.  In human beings, this structure is involved in (it has 
been co-opted or re-used for) a wide variety of other tasks, including empathetic 
identification,  decisions regarding charitable donations, affective response to pain in self 
and others, reactions to perceived unfairness in economic interactions, and assessments of 
risk. Needless to say, not all of these activities are engaged in by rats –  and when humans 
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engage in these activities, it is not by making use of  a rat insula overlaid by more 
sophisticated “purely cognitive” control structures. The distinctive functions of the 
human insula are supported by distinct anatomical structures (cf. Allman et al.,  2010)  
The alternative picture of the role of neural structures involved in “emotional” 
processing I will defend has a number of consequences that should be of interest to moral 
philosophers and philosophers of mind/psychology. First and most fundamentally, it 
suggests that we should be skeptical of the idea that reason and emotion are sharply 
distinct and mutually exclusive categories.  Second,  (and relatedly) we should skeptical 
of attempts to ground morality purely in “reason”, conceived as something distinct from 
“emotion”.   Third, there is no reason to suppose that in general the quality of judgment 
and decision- making  (in either moral or non-moral domains) would be improved to the 
extent that emotional processing plays no role in such decisions.  This is not to deny, of 
course, that involvement of particular emotions in some decisions can detract from the 
goodness of those decisions. For example, decisions made in intense rage are often not 
good decisions, either morally or prudentially.  However, this observation obviously does 
not imply that judgment and decision-making would be improved if completely 
uninfluenced by the emotion-processing structures mentioned above.  My view is that the 
general question: “does the involvement of emotion enhance or undermine the quality of 
decision-making?” rests on (or strongly suggests) a mistaken empirical presupposition --
that evaluative judgment and decision-making   among neurotypical subjects could be   
typically carried out without the involvement of emotional processing,  the only question  
being whether this would be a good  or bad thing. Since, on my view, judgment and 
decision-making, both in the moral domain and elsewhere, usually involves emotional 
processing (see below for the qualification intended by “usually”), I believe that the real 
issue is not whether emotion should be involved but rather how it should be involved. 
Thus, insofar as questions about the impact of emotion on decision-making have 
determinate answers, a better approach is to ask more specific and nuanced questions: 
e.g., for a particular kind of decision, made under such and such conditions,  does the 
involvement of this   particular  sort  of emotion improve or detract from judgment?    
 Before turning to details of my argument, however, several additional  
clarificatory comments are in order.  First, the claims that follow are intended as 
empirical and causal claims about the operation of certain neural structures and their 
influence on moral judgment and decision-making, rather than as semantic or conceptual 
claims about, e.g.,  how emotion enters into the  “meaning” of moral judgments  (as when 
it is claimed  that moral judgment “essentially involves” the expression of emotion).  The 
sorts of claims I will be defending are claims like (1.1)  “insula activation causally 
influences judgments about the appropriateness of contributing to charity” rather than 
claims like  (1.2) “when someone says stealing is wrong what is meant is that speaker has 
a strong negative emotional response (or a certain pattern of insula activation in response) 
to stealing”.   
Second,  in what follows, I sometimes claim that certain decisions are normatively 
superior to others, either prudentially or normatively. Since my intention in this paper is 
not to defend any particular global normative theory  but rather simply to explore how 
various neural structures influence moral decision-making, some explanation of the bases 
for these claims about normative superiority is in order.  In an attempt to minimize 
reliance on question-begging normative assumptions,  I  have followed a strategy of 
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appealing  to standards that are  regarded as uncontroversial by most people and are 
endorsed by many different normative  approaches. For example,  VMPFC patients 
systematically make choices  with  effects like the following:  they result in large 
financial losses,  unemployment,  and alienation of friends,  family and co-workers.  
Identifying such decisions as prudentially defective  does require normative assumptions, 
but these assumptions are not usually taken to be controversial.   Similarly, subjects who 
donate money to charity in experiments described below  show greater  activation in  
neural areas identified as involving “emotional” processing, in comparison with non-
donors. Common sense moral judgment as well as most moral theories, whether 
utilitarian or deontological, regard donations to charity as sometimes morally praise-
worthy or at least not morally inferior to decisions not to donate.  I assume such standards 
in what follows rather than arguing for them
2
. 
I should also emphasize that these assessments  of  decisions as normatively 
superior/inferior involves appeal to standards that are independent of any valuation of the 
neural processes leading to these decisions.  In other words, I do not assume that 
decisions involving some particular level of cognitive and/or emotional processing are, 
for that reason alone, inferior or superior to other decisions.  In my view, normatively 
inferior decisions can result both from processes in which so-called cognitive factors 
dominate and those in so-called emotional factors dominate, although it is also true (and 
consistent with this) that damage to areas like VMPFC/OFC tends to lead to consistently 
inferior prudential decisions.      
 
2. The Basic Picture 
 
       I first sketch the basic picture I will  defend and then turn to details.  I see the 
structures  mentioned  above as involved in emotional processing  (VMPFC/OFC and so 
on)   as all having the function of processing information  about positive and negative  
reinforcers, or, as they  are also described in the neurobiological literature,   “rewards” 
and “punishers”3.   The current understanding is that these structures compute (literally -- 
see below) values (for the organism) associated with reinforcers and actions undertaken 
to provide reinforcers.  Primary reinforcers are reinforcers which are such that it does not 
have to be learned that they are rewarding, because, e. g., this is specified genetically.  
Thus sweet-tasting stimuli are for most people automatically experienced as rewarding. 
Primary reinforcers include stimuli   producing specific sensory states but also very likely 
include stimuli associated with more general and abstract rewards. For example, many 
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human beings experience certain kinds of cooperative or mutually beneficial social 
interactions as intrinsically rewarding and social isolation or rejection as punishing.  In 
many cases, this is probably something that does not need to be learned. This preference 
for   pro-social interactions emerges very early in human development, prior to the 
acquisition of language and sophisticated reasoning abilities, and seems to be one of 
many features distinguishing us from other primates, such as chimpanzees, who do not 
seem to have the sorts of affective processing that lead them to value cooperative 
interactions in the way that humans often do
4
.  The view taken here is thus that the value 
humans attach to cooperation and pro-social interactions is not just a matter of our being 
smarter or more rational than chimpanzees or better calculators of long-term self-interest, 
but also reflects a difference in the emotions we experience and what we care about.   
      Organisms like ourselves who are able to act flexibly require a great deal more than 
just a genetic specification of primary reinforcers. In particular, organisms capable of 
behavioral flexibility must  be able to learn about secondary reinforcers—stimuli or 
objects that are predictive of the arrival of primary reinforcers, but often only imperfectly 
or probabilistically.  For example, assuming that sweetness signals the presence of a 
substance that is biologically valuable, an organism must learn that certain  foodstuffs 
will taste sweet and that others are foul-tasting.  This involves a process by which the 
reward value that attaches to the primary reinforcer also comes to be associated with 
stimuli that are predictive of it, so that reward circuitry also becomes activated when, say, 
ripe blueberries are present because these are predictive of sweetness. In fact, the same 
reward circuitry and processing that are activated by primary reinforcers are also 
activated by secondary reinforcers or the expectation that they will occur.  In human 
beings, reward learning and processing is sufficiently flexible that all sorts of stimuli  
may acquire the status of secondary reinforcers through learning. For example, monetary 
reward, although of no intrinsic biological significance, activates the same reward 
processing circuitry that is involved in responding to more “biological” stimuli like 
pleasing tastes.   A similar point holds for many socially and morally relevant stimuli.    
Thus choices to give to charity, as well as decisions to behave cooperatively in prisoner’s 
dilemmas   activate the same neural circuitry as is active when subject experience  
rewards connected to sensory gratification.   One important consequence   is that there 
appears to be nothing in the brain corresponding to a “moral module” and no neural 
structures specifically devoted only to moral judgment or the processing of moral values.   
As mentioned above, in many ecologically realistic circumstances  secondary 
reinforcers are associated only probabilistically with the arrival of primary reinforcers.   
This is particularly true of the social environment in which, for example, we may have (at 
best) probabilistic information about how others are likely to behave toward us.  For this 
reason, the structures   involved in reward processing might be expected to be—and in 
fact are—highly sensitive to probabilistic information relevant to the arrival of 
reinforcers. In particular, there is evidence that structures like insula and VMPFC/OFC 
integrate information about reward value with relevant probabilistic information – 
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indeed, these structures seem to compute features such as  the expected value of reward  
or  reward variance (Quartz, 2009).  Structures like VMPFC/OFC are also involved in 
rapidly adjusting estimates of expected reward value as the probability distributions 
governing rewards change, as in reversal learning, when previously rewarding outcomes 
become punishing and vice –versa.   Again this role is particularly important in social 
contexts—for example, when your previous friend suddenly becomes your enemy or vice 
–versa. In addition,  some neural structures involved in emotional processing and 
valuation  such as  the amygdala are sensitive to (among many other things) the presence 
of uncertainty   as opposed to risk. In situations involving risk one does not know the 
outcomes of one’s choices with certainty but does know the probability distribution 
governing those outcomes.  By contrast, in situations involving uncertainty one does not 
know the probability distribution governing the outcomes resulting from one’s actions, as 
would be the case if one were required to bet on a coin toss without knowing anything 
about the bias of the coin. Human beings (and presumably other animals as well) treat 
risk very differently from uncertainty, as evidenced by such phenomena as the Ellsberg 
paradox.   In particular,  they tend to be  very averse to uncertainty—averse in the sense 
that they try to avoid choices involving uncertainty if   possible, and, when these are 
unavoidable, often choose very conservatively in such cases, employing worse-case or 
maximin, rather than expected utility reasoning. These features of human emotional 
response involving risk and uncertainty figure importantly in moral and political 
theorizing: compare Rawls’ characterization of his original position, which conceives of 
the parties as choosing under conditions of uncertainty, with Harsanyi’s treatment, which 
treats this situation as involving only risk. Because the Rawlsian parties choose under 
conditions of uncertainty, it seems (given our aversion to uncertainty) intuitive or 
psychologically natural to suppose, as Rawls claims, that they will employ conservative, 
maximin reasoning. By contrast, because as Harsanyi conceives of matters, his parties 
face a situation of risk, his claim that they will employ expected utility reasoning in that 
situation and thus be led to some form of utilitarianism also seems plausible. In effect, 
Rawls’ treatment trades on the difference between the neural processing underlying risk 
and uncertainty and the way that the latter affects evaluation-- this is   one of many cases 
in which features of human neural processing involving “emotion” affect which moral 
principles we find appealing or intuitive. The sensitivity of many of the structures 
involved in emotional processing to complex and changing probability information is one 
reason why it is appropriate to think of these as involved in sophisticated and flexible 
information processing, rather than myopic, stereotyped responses.  
One important way in which the values associated with secondary reinforcers are 
learned involves reinforcement learning.  Put abstractly, a system involved in such 
learning produces signals—call them P -- that predict the arrival of some rewarding 
stimulus S’ (sweet taste) on the basis of some other stimulus S (the sight of ripe berries).  
The system detects whether S’ in fact arrives (and is rewarding) and then compares this 
with what was predicted by P.  The discrepancy between these two (between actual and 
predicted reward) yields a reward prediction error. This error is combined with the 
original prediction P to yield a new updated prediction P’ of the reward value expected 
on the basis of S which is then again compared with the actual reward.  The process is 
iterated until the prediction error approaches zero. As I note below, reward prediction 
error signals of this sort (with the right normative characteristics) have been found in a 
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number of the structures involved in emotional processing including insula, amygdala, 
and VMPFC/OFC, which is one reason why it seems appropriate to think of these 
structures as involved in learning.     
 As noted above, many commentators (particularly those influenced by RD views) 
think of emotions as associated with relatively fixed and stereotyped responses to 
environmental conditions that are unaffected by learning and experience. It should be 
obvious from my discussion above that this is a misconception: one of the advantages of 
having “emotional” structures that compute and represent values is that this greatly 
enhances behavioral flexibility and normatively appropriate modification of behavior as a 
result of learning.  Having the capacity to compute value assessments which reflect input 
from a variety of sources and to then use this to guide judgment and action allows 
organisms to move beyond fixed input/output patterns of response
5
.    
      All of this has been very abstract and the reader may well wonder what it has to 
do with moral judgment and decision-making.   More detailed examples will be discussed 
below, but to illustrate what I take the connection to be, consider the following generic 
example, which is a composite loosely based on a study of reports of autobiographical 
memories from ordinary subjects assembled by Jessica Escobedo at Caltech
6
.  These 
include reports by subjects of things that they had done that they regarded as wrong or 
discreditable in their lives. The reports fell into a number of different categories, but one 
not uncommon set conformed to the following pattern: The subject S, often an 
adolescent, chose some course of action A, either not thinking at all about its impact on a 
second person or being willing to discount this impact because S anticipated other 
benefits from  doing A or because S underestimated its cost for the second person.  For 
example, in one report, the subject, call her Sally, avoided going to the fair with her best 
friend so that she could go with another group of girls who were more popular.  Sally 
then became aware that her best friend felt hurt and distressed as a consequence of this 
action and this in turn led  Sally to feel distressed, guilty and ashamed —that is, to have 
aversive feelings about having done A that outweighed whatever benefits obtained from 
A.  Sally reported that these feelings were far worse than she expected. She described 
herself as having been “taught a lesson” by this experience and resolved not to do 
anything similar in the future.     
   This is an example of one-shot learning, rather than the more gradual learning  
that might take place in the presence of a probabilistic relationship and a less strongly 
aversive reinforcer but in other respects it seems   to conform to the pattern described 
above. Initially,  Sally predicts certain benefits and certain costs from choosing A, but she 
is wrong about these:  the actual consequences of A are more aversive and less rewarding 
than  predicted and this leads her to avoid A-like actions in the future. In at least this 
sense, Sally made a mistake or fell into an error in her choice of A—an error about how 
rewarding/punishing A would be to her—and she learned in the sense that she altered her 
valuation of A- like actions so that this valuation better reflected  the rewarding and 
punishing features  of the action for her.  Put slightly differently, Sally learned in the 
sense that she acquired new and more accurate  information about the reward value (for 
her) of A.  It is these notions of “information”, “learning”, “mistake”, “error” and so on 
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that I have in mind when I describe structures like VMPFC/ OFC as engaged in learning 
about reward value and involved in error correction.   
More systematic studies of moral learning  show episodes of the sort just 
described are common (although they are certainly not the only form of moral learning—
see below). In his research on young children, Martin Hoffman (2001) describes a 
process, which he calls “induction”, which works in roughly the following way: A child 
engages in what an adult would regard as a moral transgression (Mary hits Harry, causing 
him to cry). The adult then draws Mary’s attention to Harry’s reaction and says 
something like “How would you like it if Harry did that to you?” , thus (in many cases) 
creating or strengthening  (“inducing”) an empathetic response in Mary and an averse 
reaction to what she has done. Hoffman claims, as an empirical matter, that induction is 
much more effective than other measures (such as punishing Mary without further 
explanation) in altering behavior and in getting children to voluntarily conform to moral 
requirements.  James Blair (2005) in his studies of psychopaths claims that normal human 
adults and children possess what he calls a violence inhibition mechanism which, at least 
in many circumstances, produces an aversive response   when they cause harm to others; 
this leads them to learn to avoid harm-causing activities.  This mechanism is impaired in 
psychopaths with the result that they do not learn to avoid behavior that harms others.   
I recognize that many philosophers will wish to resist the suggestion that Sally (or 
the children described by Hoffman) have undergone  “moral learning” or the like.  They 
may wish to claim, for example, that Sally has learned only that (2.1) actions of kind A 
are aversive or punishing for her; and this is very different from (2.2) learning that A was 
morally wrong.  I fully agree that (2.1) is different from (2.2) and nothing in my 
discussion, either here or subsequently, is meant to imply otherwise.  As I see the 
example, Sally learns (2.2) and part of the causal explanation for why she learns (2.2) is 
the occurrence of (2.1) and the processing underlying it.  The claim that the process 
described above causally influences Sally’s judgment that she behaved wrongly does not 
require that we commit ourselves to the idea that her moral judgment involves  “nothing 
but” her having an emotionally aversive reaction when she learns of the impact of her 
behavior on her friend.  Fortunately for our purposes, as we shall see below,  these causal 
claims by themselves suggest important consequences for moral psychology  and moral 
theory—we don’t need to supplement them with  unnecessary “nothing but” claims.  
The   moral learning present in Sally’s case   represents just one possibility, 
although a particularly important one.  Human beings engage in many other forms of 
moral learning – they can learn not just from experiencing the consequences of their own 
actions, as Sally does, but also from moral instruction (often in the form of stories and 
illustrations) in which they learn to have adverse or favorable reactions to various sort of 
behavior without actually engaging in that behavior. But these cases too seem to involve 
the same sorts of emotional processing and reward structures.   
 
3. The Role of Orbital Frontal and Ventromedial Pre-frontal Cortex 
 
       As noted above, many different neural structures are involved in emotional 
processing and the computation of reward value.  Among such structures, the 
OFC/VMPFC plays a particularly important role.  Following many others (e.g. Rolls, 
2005), I take OFC/VMPFC to contain a final, common, integrated value signal that is 
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computed via some variant of the reward learning process  described above from inputs 
provided by other neural structures, where these depend  on the nature of the decision 
problem faced.   Some of these inputs come from   structures like the amygdala and 
insula that are often described as involved in “emotional” processing,  including 
processing of information having to do with the emotional states of others (so-called 
“hot” theory of mind). Other inputs come from  structures like the right temporo-parietal 
junction (RTPJ)  and posterior   superior temporal cortex (pSTC),   often regarded as 
involved in more “cognitive”  or “cooler”  theory of mind tasks such as the ascription of 
beliefs and intentions to others
 
. For example, in a charitable giving task described below, 
willingness to give is correlated with activity in OFC/VMPFC and this signal is in turn 
modulated by input from other areas, including  both pSTC and insula. The former is 
thought to be involved in processing information about the desires and intentions of 
recipients and the latter is involved in empathetic identification.  In addition,  input that 
modulates value signals in OFC/VMPFC can also come from what are   often taken to be  
paradigmatic “cognitive control” structures like dorso-lateral prefrontal cortex (DLPFC). 
(Structures   taken by Greene and others to be fundamentally different from   “emotional” 
structures).  Although there is some uncertainty about whether there is an independent 
“value signal” originating in DLPFC (or whether instead DLPFC merely modulates 
signals in VMPFC/OFC), the weight of opinion at present seems to be  that  all rewarding 
and punishing stimuli, as well as their combined or integrated significance are  eventually 
represented   in some way in OFC/VMPFC.  It is thus assumed that these structures have 
the function of combining reward signals concerning quite different stimuli into a   
“common currency” that guides comparison and choice among different alternatives, as 
when an animal must choose between continuing to exploit a food source and a mating 
opportunity.  Such a common currency is thought to be required if decision-makers are to 
choose in   a minimally consistent way, avoiding, e.g.,  intransitive preferences. (Damage 
to VMPFC/OFC produces, among many other pathologies,  violations  of transitivity—
Schoenbaum et al, 2011.)  Moreover, as one would expect from the characteristics needed 
if such a signal is to guide all-things-considered judgment and decision in situations in 
which probabilities attach to outcomes, it does not merely represent that some stimulus or 
outcome is valued more or less than another but instead represents something  more like 
reward magnitude—in other words the signal has a “cardinal-like”, rather than merely 
ordinal, character, which makes possible the representation of quantities like expected 
reward.    
As is well –known from cases like that of Phineas Gage or EVR (Anderson et al., 
1999), OFC/VMPFC patients suffer from many pathologies in choice and decision-
making, apparent both in laboratory contexts and real life. The best characterization of 
these incapacities are a matter of on-going disagreement but they include choices that are 
highly imprudent, failure to learn from mistakes, problems in emotional regulation, and 
failure to conform to ordinary norms of social behavior.  A recent review (Schoenbaum et 
al. 2011) takes the fundamental impairment to be a failure to learn about the valuations of 
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expected outcomes 
7
 , which is very much in line with the account I have advocated, but 
in any event such patients are profoundly disabled and require institutionalization.   
Several other features of OFC/VMPFC are worth emphasizing. First, not only are 
there extensive projections forward from structures like the amygdala and insula   to 
OFC/VMPFC, there are also backwards projections from OFC/VMPFC to these 
structures. These allow OFC/VMPFC to influence and modulate these structures, rather 
than just serving as receivers to which they broadcast.   Acquisition/ learning of 
normatively appropriate responses in structures like the amydala is thought to depend on 
appropriate modulatory input from structures like OFC/VMPFC—for example, according 
to one prominent theory (Blair, 2005), psychopathy is associated with deficiencies in 
VMPFC/ amygdala connections, leading to failure to develop aversive responses to harm 
inflicted on others.  In general, during the process of normal maturation, from childhood 
to adulthood, functional connectivity between VMPFC/OFC and other structures like 
amygdala and insula increases (Decety, 2011).   
Given the evidence just reported about the role of a common set of structures 
involved in the representation of the values of stimuli as food and money, a very natural 
expectation is that these same structures should also be involved in moral evaluation and 
the representation of moral value. This is exactly what is reported in a number of recent 
papers.   In an fMRI experiment investigating brain regions involved in charitable giving 
(Hare et al. 2010),  subjects were given an amount of money which  they could donate to 
charities. Subjects were imaged in both a forced giving task in which they were required 
to make donations and a “free choice” task in which they made their own decisions about 
donations.  In the latter task, but not the former, a value signal was present in 
VMPFC/OFC which correlated with amount donated, suggesting that this signal 
computed the value to the subject of making a donation. This signal in VMPFC/OFC was 
found in turn to be modulated by areas known to be involved in social cognition, in this 
case anterior insula and posterior superior temporal cortex.  pSTC is thought to be 
involved in shifting attention to another’s perspective and to contain an updating signal in 
contexts in which the optimal choice involves detecting the intentions of others  (Behrens 
et al, 2008, Hampton et al. 20008) . Both regions have been found in other studies to be 
active in tasks involving altruistic giving. The general picture is thus again one in which a 
value signal computed in the  “emotional area” OFC reflects input from other areas, and 
in a way that seems normatively appropriate, both in the sense that charitable giving itself 
is sometimes normatively appropriate and in the sense that it seems normatively 
appropriate that areas involved in empathy and social cognition and perspective taking 
should influence decisions about charitable donations.  This is because appropriate 
charitable giving requires awareness of which choices will benefit others and these areas 
process such information. 
    Given these empirical results should we think of VMPFC/OFC (or for that 
matter, the insula and amygdala) as “cognitive” or as “emotional” areas?  In some 
important respects, much of the activity in these areas seems to be cognition-like or   
representational, or at least to be involved in “information processing”.  First, these areas 
                                                 
7
 These authors explicitly deny (and provide evidence against the claim) that the primary 
role of OFC is to inhibit inappropriate responses, as suggested in the Shenhav and Greene 
paper discussed below, or to flexibly encode associative information.   
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are involved in calculation,  computation,  and learning and these are activities which are 
often thought of as “cognitive”.  In addition, signals in VMPFC/OFC, as well as in  
structures like insula are representational in the sense of representing quantities like 
expected reward and reward variance.  Moreover, valuations associated with his area are 
attached to representations of objects and  situations computed in occipital and temporal 
areas that are relatively cognitively complex  and in some cases rather abstract – for 
example, to  a subject’s representation of “snake”  (evaluated as dangerous) or  “offer 
received in an ultimatum game” (evaluated as unfair and exploitive). Notions of error and 
misrepresentation also often seem applicable to activities in these areas, sometimes in 
very straightforward ways.  For example, areas like insula can misrepresent experiences 
or evaluations of other subjects affected by one’s actions, in the sense of failing to 
accurately represent pain experienced by others.  More generally, these areas can also 
misrepresent  in the sense of failing to accurately represent the bearing or significance of 
various environmental stimuli for the subject or  whether they should be regarded as 
sources of concern. For example, a harmless snake may be evaluated as dangerous and so 
on.  Finally, as emphasized above, structures like VMPFC/OFC combine inputs from 
many different sources, including those usually regarded as cognitive such as the pSTC 
which also may make it seem appropriate to think of the VMPFC/PFC   as “cognitive”.  
On the other hand, if one associates “reasoning” or “cognition” with deliberate 
effortful inference involving the conscious manipulation of proposition-like mental 
structures of the sort carried out in logic and mathematics, including the use of complex 
combinations of these strcutures, then because  the information processing carried out in 
structures like VMPFC  typically does not involve this sort of conscious  inference, labels 
like “cognition” and “reasoning” seem misleading.  In addition,  the processing in 
VMPFC appears to be dedicated  and specialized in the sense that  it is quantities like 
expected reward and so on that are computed—there is no suggestion that this machinery 
might be used for other sorts of abstract reasoning.  This assessment is reinforced when 
one considers that there is independent evidence that logical and mathematical reasoning 
is generally carried out in areas like dorso-lateral prefrontal cortex  (DLPFC) that are 
distinct from the areas  standardly associated with emotional processing.    
Characterization of areas like VMPFC as involving “reasoning” will also be   misleading 
if one also associates reasoning with the absence of affect or if one thinks of one of the 
roles of reasoning to be the suppression of  emotion or its replacement with other sorts of 
“purely rational” motivations.    
These considerations lead me to   suggest  that invoking a dichotomy between 
cognition and emotion (= non-cognitive)  and then arguing about which side of this 
dichotomy the activity of structures like VMPFC/OFC  should be placed is  probably not  
a fruitful way of proceeding.  If by “emotional” we mean structures that are affective, 
involved in evaluation (appraisal of what ought to be the case) and in motivation, then 
structures like VMPCF/OFC are indeed involved in “emotional” processing, but this does 
not mean that they are non-representational, impervious to influence from learning or by 
cognitive structures, or  passive in the sense of not involved in modulation and control of 
other neural structures.  Processing in such structures seem to involve an intermixture of  
elements we assocate with information-processing and affect.  
Whether or not this skepticism about the emotion/cognition dichotomy is correct,   
it definitely seems wrong to think of the role of the insula  in the charitable donation 
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experiment as merely a “distractor” or   alarm bell which, unless suitably controlled, 
would undermine the superior decisions that would otherwise be made by purely  
“cognitive” processing. Judged by both deontological and utilitarian standards,  the 
normatively superior decisions in this experiment,  will at least sometimes involve 
donating to charity rather than keeping all of the money for oneself. Moreover, 
willingness to do this, as we have seen, is correlated with and apparently causally 
influenced by level of insula activation.  Thus, assuming the above standard for what is 
normatively appropriate in charitable giving, subjects whose choices are not influenced 
by their “emotional” insulas make normatively inferior decisions, in comparison with 
those who are so influenced
8
.    
 
4. Greene on Deontological versus Utilitarian Decision-Making 
 
 With this as background, I want now to turn to some very interesting and 
influential  papers by Joshua Greene on the neural structures involved in moral 
judgment
9
. In Greene et al., 2004, subjects were presented with a series of moral 
dilemmas   designed to elicit choices that were either more “utilitarian” or more 
“deontological”. Greene et al. found greater activation in VMPFC among   deontological  
(as opposed to utilitarian ) decision makers and more activation in DLPFC among 
utilitarian as opposed to deontological decision-makers. On the basis of their 
identification of VMPFC as an “emotional” area and DLPFC as “cognitive”, Greene et al.  
concluded that deontological decisions were  differentially associated  with emotional 
processing and utilitarian decisions with more cognitive processing. In a similar vein,  
reports from several sources (e.g. Koenings et al.,   2007) that patients with lesions to 
VMPFC make more utilitarian decisions, were taken to show that  utilitarian decisions 
                                                 
8
  Of course, it might be responded that such subjects are irrational (or “non-rational”), 
since their choices are influenced by “emotion”, and that even in the absence of any 
influence from emotional areas like insula, subjects who are “rational” would be led just 
through the exercise of their reason to donate large amounts to charity ( perhaps on the 
grounds that reason tells me that it would be “irrational” to give any  particular 
preference to myself over any other sentient creature  in the universe or some such.)   If 
this is understood as an empirical claim and “rational” subjects are understood as those  
showing a high level of activity in cognitive areas like DLPFC, then this response 
predicts that  subjects with such high levels of cognitive activity and no activity in 
emotional areas like insula will make large charitable donations—a claim for which, as 
far as I know, there is no evidence. If the claim is understood as an apriori or conceptual 
one (in effect building a willingness to donate into the definition of “rationality”) then 
one faces the problem that subjects with a high level of activity in what are thought to be 
“cognitve” areas still may not be rational according to this definition.  
 
9
 Although I express some skepticism below about several of Greene’s claims, I want to 
say explicitly that, probably more than any other researcher, he has played a central role 
in developing and driving forward the whole area of investigation of the neural structures 
underlying moral judgment.  Disagreement with him is a measure of the extent to which  
his ideas have established the agenda and framework for discussion in this area.   
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rely less or not at all on emotional processing, again on the basis of the claim that the 
VMPFC is an emotional area.   Following the RD position outlined in Section 1, Greene 
et al.  also hold
 
 that greater involvement of “cognitive” processing generally leads to 
normatively superior decisions.  They thus conclude   that these results about neural 
processing provide support for the superiority of utilitarianism as a normative doctrine, a 
claim which has also been endorsed by Singer (2005).   
 A more recent paper by Shenhav and Greene (2010) complicates these claims in 
an interesting way. These authors presented subjects with hypothetical choices involving 
rescuing groups of people of different sizes with different probabilities of success. They 
found what they describe as:   
a   BOLD signal in VMPFC/MOFC   correlated with the “expected moral value” 
of decision options  --   the interaction between  the value of various outcomes  
and probability. This is consistent with the hypothesis that this region supports the 
integration of positive and negative reward signals into a more abstract 
representation of value, a kind of decision ‘‘currency’’.  (p. 671) 
They add,  “our results suggest that an individual’s sensitivity to lives/saved lost 
in the context of moral judgment is in part determined by the same mechanisms that 
determine the individual’s sensitivity to the probability of losses and to overall reward in 
the context of economic decision-making” (673).   Thus, their results fit very nicely with 
the ideas described in earlier sections of this paper, according to which the OFC/VMPFC 
contains an overall, integrated signal which represents moral, as well as other kinds of 
value, and which takes account of information about probabilities.   
  As so far described, the results from this paper say nothing about distinctively 
utilitarian moral decision –making.  In fact, Shenhav and Greene found a value signal in 
OFC/VMPFC among decision-makers who have what they consider to be a utilitarian 
orientation but they also found such a signal among more deontological decision-makers.     
This is exactly what one should expect if, as argued above, OFC/VMPFC is involved in  
the representation of value for all those who make judgments or decisions, whether 
utilitarian or deontological.  Of course, this value representation will differ in detail in 
utilitarian and non-utilitarian decision-makers, since these subjects do, after all, make 
different decisions, with this difference presumably reflecting differences in input from 
other neural structures, but both the results from Shenhav and Greene and those described 
in earlier sections suggest that this will not be a matter of the deontologically inclined 
making use of an entirely different system or mechanism of value representation and 
computation from those who make utilitarian judgments. This has an important 
consequence: If VMPFC/OFC has a role in all decision-making, then it appears that one 
can’t argue for the moral superiority of utilitarianism   over deontology merely on the 
grounds that  the “emotional”  VMPFC/OFC is involved only in the latter. 
    Is there nonetheless some basis for retaining the idea that utilitarian decision-
making has a distinctive neural  signature? As I understand them,  Shenhav and Greene 
remain committed to the idea that that utilitarian decision-making disproportionately 
involves “cognitive” processing, although they now identify the OFC as involved in such 
processing (whereas previously Greene regarded it   as an “emotional” area) . They write: 
 
  We found that increased activity in bilateral lateral OFC … was associated 
with more frequent endorsement of utilitarian trade-offs. According to Greene et 
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al.’s dual-process theory of moral judgment…, utilitarian judgments are driven 
primarily by controlled cognitive processes, which may compete with 
countervailing emotional responses. These results are broadly consistent with this 
dual- process theory, given the implication of lateral OFC in reducing the influence 
of emotional distracters on judgments (regulating pain and negative emotions, 
(favoring delayed rewards over more immediate ones), inhibiting socially 
inappropriate behaviors), and more generally controlling the influence of emotional 
responses that interfere with the pursuit of more distal goals (673).  
 
   Noting that Greene had previously suggested that utilitarian judgment was 
associated with increased activity in DLPFC  (a “cognitive” area) rather than OFC,  
Shenhav and Greene go  on to suggest that DLPFC may be associated with effortful 
cognitive control of emotions, while OFC may be involved in more “implicit modulation 
of affective representations”, adding that this is “consistent with the aforementioned 
literature implicating the lateral OFC in performing a gating or weighing function as 
opposed to the overriding of a prepotent response” (674).   
Let me make what I hope are some constructive suggestions about this, which 
may or may not accord with Greene’s current views.   First, the change in classification 
of OFC (or OFC/VMPFC) from “emotional” to “cognitive” seems to me support the 
misgivings expressed earlier about the clarity and usefulness of this distinction.  Second, 
phrases like “inhibition”,  “reducing the influence of emotional distractors” , and 
“modulation” suggest  a range of different pictures concerning the relation between the  
VMPFC/OFC and the input which it regulates. It is important to be clear about which of 
these pictures is most appropriate.  It seems  fairly clear both from Shenhav and Greene’s 
paper and from the other results reported in section  3  that it is misguided to think of the 
role of the VMPFC/ OFC as  one of entirely removing  or suppressing the influence of 
“emotional”  or affective factors on decision-making, allowing only purely cognitive or 
rational factors to be operative.  Assuming one thinks of structures like the amygdala and 
insula as engaged in emotional processing, then a picture according to which  information 
from these sources is  integrated   or synthesized with from  information from other 
sources by the VMPFC/OFC  when judgment and decision-making are functioning in 
normatively appropriate ways seems more correct than a model in which emotional 
influences are excised from decision-making, either by VMPFC/OFC or other structures.  
This is not at all to deny that judgment and decision in which VMPFC/OFC exercises 
top-down control or regulation are  often normatively superior to judgments and 
decisions in which these structures are not  playing this role—if nothing else, this is 
suggested by the poor quality of decision-making in subjects in which these structures are 
damaged. But it does suggest that this normative superiority, when present, is not just a 
matter of “cognition” inhibiting “emotion”. Rather than thinking of the activity of 
VMPFC/ OFC as “cognitive” simply on the grounds that it involves regulation of 
emotion, it seems to me more natural (echoing the arguments of section 3) to think of 
these structures as neither exclusively cognitive or exclusively emotional, but rather as 
combining elements of both.    
I can expand on this point and  also on the role of effortful “cognitive control” 
involving structures like DLPFC in decision-making by comparing Shenhav and 
Greene’s experiment to two very interesting papers by  Hare  et al. (2009, 2011) on 
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dietary choice. In the experiments reported in Hare et al. 2009, self-described dieters 
were scanned while asked to rate food stuffs for health and tastiness separately.  For each 
subject, a reference item was selected that was neutral for both taste and health and 
subjects were then presented with choices between various food items and these neutral 
items.  Subjects who were self-controllers (that is, subjects who chose healthy items) 
were found to make their decisions on the basis of both health and taste and exhibited 
activity in VMPFC that reflected the integrated influence of both health and taste 
considerations, as expressed in the earlier ratings. By contrast, signals in VMPFC of non-
self controllers reflected the influence only of taste evaluations. The crucial difference 
was that in the self-control group,  VMPFC activity was modulated by DLPFC, generally 
thought of as a more cognitive area , which is consistent with  a large body of 
independent evidence implicating the DLPFC in “cognitive control”.  At least in these 
experiments, however,  there was no evidence for a “value signal” within DLPFC; 
instead DLPFC influenced or modulated evaluation of food items, by influencing the 
value signal within VMPFC.   
The second paper confirmed and extended this picture, showing that when 
individuals made healthy choices and exercised self-control, the value signal in VMPFC 
was modulated by DLPFC in such a way that greater value was attached to healthier 
foods in comparison with tasty foods.  
Suppose, for the sake of argument, that, as  Greene claims, increased activity in 
areas associated with “effortful” cognitive or executive control like DLPFC (in addition 
to   “gating” activity on the part of VMPFC/OFC) is characteristic of utilitarian decision-
makers.  Focusing for the moment just on the role of DLPFC,  if what goes on among 
such “utilitarian” subjects is like what goes on among subjects who exercise dietary self-
control,  perhaps what one should expect is the following: in both  deontological and 
utilitarian subjects, a value signal associated with choice and judgment will be present in 
VMPFC /OFC, which is just what Shenhav and Greene found.  However, (continuing this 
line of thought) for utilitarian (as opposed to deontological) subjects, there will be more 
activity in DLPFC and perhaps other cognitive areas which will operate so as to modulate 
this value signal. Put differently, if one wants to continue to think of VMPFC/OFC as an 
“emotional” area, then the difference between deontological and utilitarian subjects will 
not be, as some of the language in Greene’s earlier papers perhaps suggested, that the 
former rely solely on input from emotional areas and the latter solely on input from 
cognitive areas, but rather that both rely on valuation signals in VMPFC in judgment and 
decision-making, but, in the case of utilitarian decision makers, in contrast to 
deontological decision makers, this emotional input will  in addition be  more influenced 
by processing in areas associated with cognition and executive control.  I will add that if, 
as I have already suggested, the “emotional” and “cognitive” labels are not terribly 
helpful in this context, it might be even better to put matters in terms of a contrast 
between valuation   that includes but is not limited to areas associated with executive 
control and working memory versus valuation not involving those areas, or involving 
them to a lesser degree (but perhaps involving other areas to a greater degree—see 
below).   Going further one might also suggest, in contrast to a standard “dual process” 
picture in which there are two “systems”, asymmetrically related, in which one  has the 
role of inhibiting or correcting mistakes made by the other,  it may be more appropriate to 
think in terms of  on- going reciprocal interaction and feedback,  involving a number of  
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“systems” rather than just two.  Consistently with all this, one might still retain the idea 
that greater involvement of systems associated with cognitive control, like DLPFC and 
whatever else one might want to include in this category, typically leads to normatively   
superior decisions and that in virtue of such involvement, these decisions tend to be 
“utilitarian”, thus yielding an argument for utilitarianism as a normative theory along 
broadly the same lines that Greene has endorsed before. 
I put this forward as a way of framing or reframing Greene’s views –- as a 
friendly amendment (or perhaps a description of what he now thinks). I want now, 
however, to raise some questions about the resulting picture:  First, note that given the 
overall argument above, it is not clear  why one should expect to see  areas involved in 
cognitive control only when there is “utilitarian” choice.   An alternative, and in many 
ways more natural, assumption is that higher levels of “cognitive control” are required 
whenever  a  subject  successfully suppresses  and acts against a strong initial adverse 
reaction to  some course of action, whether this action is recommended by utilitarianism 
of not
10
.  As an extreme (but real) case, consider those fanatical Nazis who described 
themselves as feeling empathy for their victims and revulsion at killing them but who 
self-consciously set out to suppress these feelings in favor of what they took to be their 
duty to conform to Nazi doctrine,  acting out of what some commentators have described 
as a sort of perverted or distorted Kantianism  that  prescribed duty’s for sake. One might 
conjecture that these Nazis had rather high levels activity in DLPFC  and other cognitive 
control areas as they struggled against their feelings of humanity but their choices were 
not “utilitarian” either in the sense that they conformed to what utilitarianism understood 
as a normative doctrine requires  or in the sense that they were attempting to decide on 
the basis of utilitarian considerations. 
A less extreme case, conceivably subject to experimental investigation,  might 
involve someone who is committed to conforming to some requirement regulating diet or    
religious observance   and is tempted, for either self interested or  non-religious other 
regarding reasons not to follow this requirement (e.g. perhaps helping someone in need 
would involve violating this requirement).  If Rangel’s diet experiment is any guide, 
successful resistance to the  temptation to violate the requirement  would involve activity 
in DLPFC  and other areas associated with cognitive control,  including perhaps 
VMPFC/OFC, even though successful resistance  may not (and often will not) be  
recommended by utilitarianism,  or based on explicit  utilitarian calculation, or, from the 
point of view of many of us, normatively appealing.    
One possible response   concedes the possibility just described but contends  it is 
not the ecologically most common or usual situation.  That is, it might be suggested that 
most often, although admittedly not always, when people exert strong executive/cognitive 
control they are reasoning in a utilitarian ways and conversely when people engage in 
                                                 
10
 Another way of putting this point is that the dilemmas employed by Greene are 
those in which the “utilitarian” choices require actions which for most people require 
suppression of some strong adverse reaction to the course chosen. The issue us whether 
neural activity observed in connection with such choices reflect this fact, rather than   
distinctively utilitarian content of the choices. For some similar concerns, see Kahane 
(2012).  
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utilitarian reasoning, they tend to make use of areas involved in such control. Because 
such involvement tends to improve the normative quality of decision- making, decisions 
based on utilitarian reasoning may be expected to be normatively superior.   
This leads to another set of issues.  As is perhaps obvious, I have been using  
“utilitarian decision-making” in a way that is ambiguous: it might mean (4.1)  “decision   
coinciding with the recommendations of correctly applied utilitarian principles” or it 
might mean (4.2) “decision made via deliberate explicit utilitarian calculation that 
attempts to take  account of all benefits and costs”. The argument associating 
involvement of VMPFC/OFC and DLPFC with “utilitarian decisions” seems most 
naturally understood as an argument that associates  these areas with  effortful, explicit 
utilitarian deliberation about costs and benefits—  with decisions that are utilitarian in  
sense (4.2) above. It is an old idea that if one wishes to produce outcomes that are best in 
the sense of conforming to what is recommended by utilitarian moral theory (decisions 
that are utilitarian in sense 4.1 above) the best strategy in many cases may not be to try to 
engage in explicit utilitarian calculation (sense 4.2). It may be that Greene is assuming 
the opposite—that judgments involving explicit utilitarian calculation are likely to 
produce superior outcomes by utilitarian standards. Perhaps this is right, but it is not 
obviously right, even if one is a utilitarian.   
 There is another point to be made about the notion of “utilitarian judgment” in 
sense 4.1 above: The judgments described as utilitarian in the empirical literature on 
moral decision-making reflect a very particular (and arguably controversial) conception 
of what utilitarianism requires. Roughly speaking, this conception involves a 
commitment to what I have elsewhere called “parametric” as opposed to “strategic” 
utilitarianism (Woodward and Allman, 2007).  The difference between these two 
conceptions may be illustrated by Williams’ example in which Jim, an explorer in the 
jungle, is told by Pedro that he will shoot ten villagers unless Jim shoots one (in my 
version of the story I stipulate that this one is distinct from the ten.) One sort of utilitarian 
analysis (the parametric sort) takes this to a very simple decision problem. There are two 
possibilities: (i) One person will die if Jim shoots, (ii) ten if he does not, the 
consequences under (i) are better than the consequences under (ii), therefore 
utilitarianism recommends Jim should shoot.  With this understanding of utilitarianism, a 
subject who judges that Jim should not shoot is regarded as making a “deontological” 
judgment.  
I described this utilitarian analysis as “parametric”  because it takes the decision 
problem faced by Jim to have a very simple  transparent structure characterized by  a few 
fixed and stable parameters that, moreover, Jim knows for certain: it is assumed, for 
example,  that Jim can take  Pedro at his word, so that the relevant probabilities are all 
either zero or one, and that the only relevant considerations are the number of lives saved 
under each course of action. In effect, the parametric utilitarian treats the dilemma Jim 
faces as a simple arithmetic problem.  A more “strategic” utilitarian analysis would take 
into account  considerations such as the following:  What is the probability that Pedro 
will act as he claims, rather than, say, killing the ten after Jim kills the one? Is there even 
a well-defined, knowable probability here or is situation faced by Jim characterized by 
extreme uncertainty, in the sense described in section 2, with the result that there is no 
basis for any expected utility calculation of the sort utilitarians advocate performing? 
What protections do the villagers have against Pedro after Jim kills the one and leaves, 
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with Pedro remaining?  More generally, what are Pedro’s plans and intentions in making 
this offer? Does he see some advantage in involving Jim in the killing? Does he intend 
some form of blackmail? Discrediting of Jim so that he will not be a credible witness?  
Would Jim be more effective in saving lives if he were to refuse to participate in the 
killing and go on to publicize Pedro’s behavior to the outside world? What other indirect 
effects might follow from Jim’s participation (or not) in the killing?  
 When these additional considerations are taken into account, it is no longer so 
obvious that the action recommended by “utilitarianism” is for Jim to the kill the one, 
rather than refusing, as at least some versions of deontology would require.  In any case, I 
take it that it is the choice conforming to  the recommendations of the strategic rather 
than the parametric analysis that is required by utilitarianism, since a consistent utilitarian 
must take into account all available information about the expected effects of his choices, 
as a properly peformed strategic analysis will do.   
Similar points can be made about many of the other standard “utilitarianism 
versus deontology” dilemmas in the philosophical literature—pushing the big guy in 
front of the trolley, using the organs of one patient to save the lives of five others and so 
on. In  of these cases,  a  strategic form of utilitarianism might recommend the same 
course of action as standard  versions of “deontology”. 
Several consequences follow from this observation. First, it is not obvious that 
judgments regarding such dilemmas are measures of whether subjects are “utilitarian” as 
opposed to “deontological”, rather than   measures of whether subjects are parametric as 
opposed to strategic utilitarians. Second, consider the information that strategic as 
opposed to parametric utilitarians consider. This includes (4.3) theory of mind 
information about the intentions, beliefs, desires and plans of the various actors in a 
situation, (4.4) related to these, dynamic or strategic considerations about how the 
situation may evolve over time (how Pedro will respond to Jim’s choice, what choices 
will be available to Jim in the light of that response), and (4.5) information about 
probabilities and the presence of uncertainty.  As noted above, so-called emotional areas 
are heavily involved in processing all of these kinds of information.  Since, as argued 
above, utilitarians ought to take such information into account, this provides further 
reasons for thinking that, given a commitment to utilitarianism, the involvement of such 
areas in moral judgment and decision-making can sometimes lead to normatively 
superior results.  It also provides additional reasons to be skeptical of the claim that it is a 
mark of utilitarian decision-making per se that it does not involve such areas or involves 
them only minimally
11
.    
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  It seems to me that a similar conclusion also follows for most   plausible non-
utilitarian moral theories. This is because most plausible moral theories will require 
decision-makers to be guided by accurate information about how their actions affect 
others, how others are likely to respond to one’s choices and so on. (Of course different 
theories may disagree about how such information is relevant.) As long as it is 
acknowledged that such information is often morally relevant in some way, it will be 
normatively better to take such information into account rather than ignoring it. This in 
turn requires the involvement of neural areas involved in processing such information, 
including “emotional” areas.  
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5. Moral Rationalism  
 
There is more that might be said about this line of thought but rather than 
succumbing to the temptation for further exploration, I want to step back and use some of 
the experimental results I have been describing to raise some more general questions 
about the role of “reason” and “emotion” in moral judgment and decision-making.  As I 
noted in the introduction, a very striking feature of great deal of contemporary moral 
philosophy (at least to an outsider like me) is its strongly rationalist flavor.   For the 
purposes of this paper,  “moral rationalism” can be taken to be the conjunction of two 
claims: (5.1) moral claims are the sorts of claims that can be true or false, in (as adherents 
of this doctrine say), “a mind-independent way” and (5.2) true moral claims can be 
“grasped” or recognized as such  just through the operation of “reason”—this recognition 
does not require “emotional” processing.  In this respect, the recognition of such truths is, 
according to moral rationalists, very much like the recognition of mathematical truth. Just 
as (it is supposed) emotion or affect has no role (either causally in learning or in  
justification) to play in judgments about mathematical truths, similarly for moral 
judgment 
  Many contemporary deontolgists and   many contemporary utilitarians seem 
committed to moral rationalism: both groups favor analogies between, on the one hand, 
moral judgment and the processes leading to moral judgment and, on the other, 
judgments about mathematical truth and the processes underlying the recognition of such 
truths.  Such analogies occur throughout Parfit, 2011 and in the work of deontologists 
like Kamm, who writes as follows about intuitive responses to hypothetical moral 
dilemmas:  
 
The responses to cases with which I am concerned are not emotional 
responses but judgments about the permissibility or impermissibility of 
certain acts.... These judgments are not guaranteed to be correct [but] if 
they are, they should fall into the realm of a priori truths. They are not like 
racist judgments that one race is superior to another. The reason is that the 
racist is claiming to have “intuitions” about empirical matters and this is as 
inappropriate as having intuitions about the number of the planets or the 
                                                                                                                                                 
 Let me add that some readers may find it tempting to take this consideration to  
vindicate the suggestion that  greater involvement of “cognition” leads to better moral 
decisions on the grounds that taking into account more rather than less information 
automatically amounts to a greater involvement of cognition.   I regard this as not so 
much wrong as unilluminating:  on this suggestion, all of the emotional processing areas 
discussed in this essay are doing “cognitive” processing simply in virtue of doing 
information-processing. “Cognition” has been defined in such a way that it no longer 
contrasts with emotion and indeed so that pretty much anything the brain does is 
“cognitive”. The view vindicated is thus not the RD view or the views expressed in 
Greene, 2004.  
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chemical structure of water. Intuitions are appropriate to ethics because 
ours is an a priori, not an empirical investigation. (1993, p. 8).  
 
 I will have nothing directly to say about the rationalist claim (5.1) concerning the 
truth-aptness of moral claims, but I want to suggest that that the rationalist claim (5.2) 
about the processes involved in moral judgment does not fit very well with the empirical 
facts described in this essay. Think of the Hare et al. imaging study of dieters.  The 
picture of valuation and decision-making that emerges from this and other studies 
described above might loosely be described as having both Kantian and Humean aspects. 
Following Kant, it appears there is an aspect of the self  (involving the DLPFC and other 
“cognitive” structures) associated with our reasoning abilities that can stand back from, 
assess, and attempt to influence more immediate desires (e.g., for tasty food). We can 
have such desires for immediate sensory reward and yet fail to endorse them or act on 
them.   We can also use structures like the DLPFC to alter our evaluation of immediate 
rewards relative to more distant goals like health. Contrary to Hume’s famous remark that 
“Reason is, and ought only to be the slave of the passions, and can never pretend to any 
other office than to serve and obey them”, if we associate “reason” with the DLPFC, it 
looks as though reason is not confined to merely assessing various strategies for realizing 
goals given to us by a preference or valuational structure that is fixed and independent of 
our reasoning abilities. Instead, reason can influence or modulate that structure.  Yet at 
the same time— here the underlying picture looks more Humean— the way in which 
“reason” exerts this influence is by modulating an affect-laden value signal that reflects 
input from other sources (including “emotional” areas) outside of DLPFC.  (If it is part of 
Humeanism that something affective or connotative must be present for evaluative 
judgment or decision or action to occur, and the presence of a value signal in 
VMPFC/OFC corresponds to this affective element, then this strand of Humeanism 
seems vindicated.)  As noted above,  at least in the experiments described in Hare et al. 
2009, 2011, the DLPFC does not have its own value signal which  somehow supplants or 
replaces the signal in VMPFC,  so that DLPFC  generates, as it were,  purely reason –
based valuations.  Instead DLPFC modulates evaluative signals that are influenced by 
other, “emotional” input as well.  Moreover even if, as some claim, DLPFC generates its 
own value signal, it remains the case that this signal is apparently integrated with value 
signals from other neural structures that are known to be involved in “emotional” 
processing.   
  Suppose we understand the notion of “reason” narrowly, as having to do with the 
sorts of abilities involved in   logical or mathematical reasoning and “moral rationalism” 
to be the view that considerations supplied by reason, so understood, can by themselves 
generate moral requirements. Then, as far as the experimental results described above go,  
they do not seem to provide  support for a picture  according to which claim (5.2) (above) 
in moral rationalism describes the process by which  people typically come to hold the 
moral evaluations that they do.  That is, when people make moral judgments or hold 
moral values,  these are, as an empirical matter,  not typically generated by or grounded  
in just their reasoning capacities, acting, so to speak, on their own. Instead, other 
structures which are affective or emotional also play central causal roles in moral 
judgment and valuing, just as they do in other sorts of valuation. As far as their casual 
genesis goes, in   normal cases, involving intact brains, our values result from the 
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interaction and integration of the output of these structures with the influence of other 
structures that we tend to think of as more cognitive or reason-based.  
One possible  response to this is to concede these causal claims, but to hold that 
they do not in any way undermine moral rationalism.  Recall that, as formulated above, 
moral rationalism, holds only that moral truths “can be” grasped as such by reason, not 
that this is the way they are typically recognized.  Thus (it might be argued), the 
acceptability of moral rationalism turns on whether moral requirements, correct moral 
judgments and evaluations, and so on, are derivable from considerations supplied by 
reason, understood as above. It may be true, as an empirical matter, that most people are 
not caused to make the moral judgments they make solely as result of their contemplation 
of considerations rooted in reason, construed narrowly, but as long as such judgments, 
insofar as they are correct, follow from such considerations, that is enough to vindicate 
moral rationalism.  
An obvious problem with this response is that the different theorists who claim to 
be able to ground moral requirements in derivations from principles supported by reason 
alone reach very different, indeed inconsistent conclusions about those requirements. 
Some hold that some form of utilitarianism is uniquely favored by reason, others that one 
or another form of deontology is. Each purported derivation convinces, at best, a minority 
of discussants. Everyone else regards the derivation as unsound. This is very unlike the 
situation that holds for valid arguments in logic and mathematics.  
The ideas advanced in this paper provide a simple and plausible explanation for 
this state of affairs. Reason, narrowly conceived, is too weak—too lacking in substantive 
content—to supply sound derivations of substantive moral requirements of the sort 
required.  This is why no one has been able to produce them. The additional processing 
that is at work in generating the moral judgments we make is supplied by the “emotional” 
structures discussed in this essay. When we leave these out of the picture, not enough 
remains (just in “reason” itself) to generate, either causally or as a matter of logic, the 
content of our moral judgments.  
For some this will be bleak conclusion. That we possess the emotional/evaluative 
processing structures we do is obviously a contingent matter—these structures are shaped 
by natural selection and, as I have emphasized, are apparently in some respects specific to 
human beings.  So what seems to follow is something like this: moral and other values 
are values for us or values in relation to the sort of creatures we are, rather than values 
that are “objective” in the sense of being values for all rational creatures or mattering 
independently of the emotional processing to which human beings as a species are 
susceptible.  
   For both reasons of space and competence, I will not try to discuss this 
conclusion in any detail, confining myself to just a few remarks.  First, and most 
fundamentally, one might wonder why “ethics for us” is not ethics enough (for us, that 
is). Our emotional/evaluative capacities are, as I have emphasized, plastic and influenced 
by learning, but it is not as though we can collectively simply excise them or replace 
them with something totally different. Whatever contingency in moral evaluation is 
present simply as a result of our possession of these structures may not reflect alternative 
possibilities   actually available to neurologically normal subjects.  So why should we be 
concerned about them? Even if it is true that highly intelligent social insects or 
chimpanzees would find very different moral requirements appealing (see below for more 
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on this possibility), why should this matter to human beings, who cannot simply assume 
the  affective and motivational capacities of these creatures?  
Second, a number of influential moral and political philosophers are sympathetic 
to the idea that the derivation of substantive moral conclusions requires a notion of reason 
or reasoning that is thicker or more contentful than the thin notion described above. For 
example, one might think of the notion of what is “reasonable” as this occurs in Rawls 
and Scanlon as embodying such a thicker notion. From the perspective adopted in this 
essay, one might attempt to flesh out the additional content possessed by this thicker 
notion of the “reasonable” in terms of the role played by emotional  and affective 
structures and their interaction with other more cognitive structures. It is this additional 
content that would allow us to say such things as: “although it may not be contrary to 
reason, narrowly conceived, to prefer the destruction of the rest of the world to the 
pricking of my finger, it is certainly unreasonable to have such a preference, and others 
could reasonably reject my acting on such a preference”.  Here part of the content of 
“reasonable” would be supplied by the pro-social emotions and affect that are the output 
of structures like VMPFC/OFC etc.   One consequence of making use of this thicker, 
more affect-laden notion of reason in moral argument may be that one is also forced to 
recognize that our possession of it is the result of various biological contingencies. 
However, wishing that matters were otherwise, is not an argument that they are 
otherwise.  
  As I noted above, the suggestion that our moral commitments reflect features of 
our emotional processing is presumably troubling to some in part because it seems to 
raise the possibility of a group of creatures who are as rational and intelligent as human 
beings with respect to activities like logic and mathematics but very different 
emotionally.  For example, we may be tempted to imagine a population of primates with 
the emotional/affective/motivational capacities of chimpanzees who are nonetheless as 
intelligent as humans. Although “rational”, they may be (because of their emotional 
capacities and the valuations to which this leads), far less cooperative than we are, much 
more hierarchical, disinclined to treat one another as equals except when it is in their self-
interest to do so and so on. This seems to raise the troubling question of whether, in view 
of these differences, we should think of this population as subject to very different moral 
requirements from those which we think govern human populations.  We might also find 
it tempting to ask whether, in view of their shared rationality, this population would 
discover and come to regard as binding a set of moral requirements similar to those we 
endorse, despite their affective differences, as some optimistic moral rationalists might 
suppose.  (And we might also ask whether they would be subject to these requirements 
even if, because of their affective differences, they were rarely motivated to conform to 
them.)  
     I think this thought experiment rests on a very problematic assumption-- that 
cognitive/rational abilities can evolve independently of emotional/affective/motivational 
capacities.  In my view, we are as smart as we are at logic and related activities in part 
because of the emotional/affective differences that separate us from chimps and that 
make possible for us forms of social life and interaction that are unavailable to chimps. 
And those different emotional capacities would not have been useful to us or favored by 
natural selection if we were not also able to use them in conjunction with cognitive 
capacities that differentiate us from chimps. In short, there is every reason to suppose that 
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the emotional   processing subserved by structures like the VMPFC/OFC co-evolve with 
capacities associated with structures like DLPFC.  I certainly don’t claim that it follows 
that creatures with cognitive capacities like ours would automatically also possess 
emotional/affective processing just like ours, but I do claim that such creatures are 
unlikely to have the emotional lives of chimps, honeybees or, for that matter, human 
psychopaths—such creatures will instead possess forms or emotional processing or 
valuation that lead to some degree of cooperation and concern for others
12
.  
 
6. Internalism versus Externalism  
 
Let me now turn to some additional issues having to do with “internalism”. 
Philosophers like to debate whether moral judgment (or perhaps “sincere” moral 
judgment) is “intrinsically motivating”.  If the account I have been defending is on the 
right track, the following picture seems correct. If we confine attention to neurotypical 
subjects, then, as we have seen, moral judgment is  (at least often or usually) causally 
influenced by a value signal in OFC /VMPFC—this is true both for subjects who make 
deontological and subjects who make utilitarian choices.  People can of course make 
moral judgments in circumstances in which there is no opportunity to undertake actions 
associated with those judgments, but when action or behavior is possible, these value 
signals also typically causally influence choice of action.   Thus, as a matter of empirical 
fact,  in  neurotyicals  the evaluations that causally influence moral judgment often also 
causally influence choice of action, when there is opportunity for the latter.  This 
empirical fact apparently holds whether or not it is also true that it is a conceptual or 
semantic truth that sincere moral judgment  always motivates or influences action.  
 Some recent work on internalism and related issues has focused on the 
implications of various special or atypical populations  (psychopaths, patients with 
VMPFC damage, autistics etc) with compromised processing in emotional areas for these 
issues.  (See, e.g., Roskies, 2003).  Suppose, for example, we come to believe that 
psychopaths can make genuine moral judgments or recognize that some actions are 
morally wrong without being motivated at all to act in accord with these judgments.  
Would this show that internalism is mistaken? If, on the other hand,  we decide that 
psychopaths cannot make genuine moral judgments because they do not engage in the 
emotional processing that typically accompanies this in neurotypicals, does this  provide 
support for internalism or undercut moral rationalism?   
 I think that   my remarks above can help cast some light on these questions.  At 
the risk of oversimplifying, I take the general picture of these special populations that is 
emerging to be the following. (Cf. Glenn et al., 2009, Young et al. 2010, 2012) 
Psychopaths, VMPFC patients, and autistics can use sentences expressing moral 
                                                 
12
  A referee asks whether I am claiming that it somehow conveniently works out 
that our emotional apparatus has been moulded by natural selection in such a way that we 
make moral judgments that are “correct” by some standard entirely independent of that 
apparatus.  This is not what I am claiming; my talk of “ethics for us” is meant to suggest 
there is no such independent standard.  
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judgments like “Stealing is wrong” in ways that show normal linguistic competence. For 
some range of cases, such subjects will also make judgments that are not very different 
from the judgments made by neurotyicals—they will agree or at least say they agree that 
stealing is wrong.  Nonetheless, subjects in these special populations tend to differ from 
judgments made by neurotypicals in more subtle ways, with the nature of the difference 
depending on the character of the impairments in the different special populations.  For 
example, VMPFC patients have been found to differ from neurotyicals in their judgments 
of the wrongfulness of actions that involve attempts to produce harm and, as noted above, 
they also tend to make different (more “utilitarian”) judgments with respect to certain 
moral dilemmas such as the trolley problem.  Psychopaths judge non-intentional harms 
more leniently than normals. In contrast to neurotypicals, high functioning autistics are 
reported to not reliably judge accidental and attempted harms as morally different. To the 
extent that such subjects have impaired functioning in OFC/VMPFC or in structures like 
the amygdala that provide input to these, we can conclude (quite independently of any 
differences in the content of their judgments) that it must be the case that the causal 
pathways leading to their moral judgments are different from or are functioning 
differently from those employed by neurotypical subjects. It is presumably these 
differences that lead to the subtle differences in judgment described above.  Thus one 
possibility – arguably a natural conjecture—is that  although subjects in special 
populations are sometimes able to produce moral judgments that are similar to those 
produced by neurotypicals, they do  this by making use of processing that is quite 
different from that employed by neurotypicals.  (See Glenn et al. 2009 for a similar 
suggestion). For example, someone with impaired or abnormal processing in structures 
like OFC/VMPFC might nonetheless have been able to learn a set of moral rules or 
maxims that are generally accepted in her society—that it is wrong to steal, kill and so 
on. These might be committed to memory and then be deployed to answer moral 
judgment questions through the activity of structures like DLPFC without any 
involvement of emotional structures.  This may result in judgments that exhibit 
considerable overlap with those made in more normal ways by neurotypicals for some 
range of cases, while differing in more subtle ways in tasks that require deployment of 
structures like OFC/VMPFC (such as trolley problems). To the extent that such subjects 
make moral judgments without making use of structures like OFC/VMPFC, it seems 
entirely possible that there may be no associated motivation to act or at least a weaker or 
different motivation than in neurotypicals.  
Philosophers who are sympathetic to the idea that moral judgments must, for 
conceptual or semantic reasons, be motivating or involve emotional processing are often 
tempted to suppose that moral judgments of psychopaths  and other special population 
subjects are not “genuine” or “sincere” moral judgments because they lack the  elements 
of normal processing just described. This move strikes me as question-begging (or at 
least unfruitful) in the absence of some independent characterization of what makes a 
moral judgment real or sincere. On the other side, philosophers sympathetic to 
rationalism and externalism sometimes take the apparent possibility of moral judgment in 
special populations to show that there is no intrinsic or essential connection between 
moral judgment and motivation. Whatever one thinks of this last claim, it is important 
that it not lead us to overlook the causal connection between emotional processing, 
valuation, judgment, and motivation that is usually present in neurotypicals.  In other 
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words, when construed not as a universally true conceptual/semantic claim, but rather as 
an empirical claim about what is usual in neurotypical populations, internalism has much 
to recommend it. Moreover, if the conjectures advanced above are correct, it also seems 
to follow that the moral judgments endorsed by special populations are to a substantial 
extent parasitic on the judgments of neurotypicals in the sense that those in the special 
populations learn to make these judgments by mimicking those of surrounding 
neurotypicals.  If this is correct, there is no reason to suppose  a population consisting 
entirely of psychopaths without any contact with neurotyicals would acquire on its own 
tendencies to moral judgment that even loosely resemble those of neurotypicals.  
So far I have neglected an issue that may seem central to debates about 
internalism and moral rationalism. This has to with the significance of differences, not 
between human beings and other species, or between neurotypicals and special 
populations, but among neurotypicals in emotional processing and evaluative assessment.  
Both casual observation and more careful empirical observation support the claim that 
neurotypical humans vary considerably in emotional/evaluative response, particularly in 
the moral sphere. Some people are very empathetic and find helping others rewarding (at 
least for some others), other people much less so. Does it follow that, e.g., the extent to 
which moral requirements are binding on people (or the extent to which they have 
“reasons” to conform to such requirements) depends on the extent to which their affective 
processing is such that they value acting in conformity to these requirements?  
In my view, nothing I have said above requires a positive answer to this question. 
Although the matter deserves more discussion than I can give it here, my view, very 
roughly, is that it is generic facts about human emotional processing and valuation, 
characteristic of us as a species, rather than individual differences, that are regulative 
when it comes to moral requirements and reasons. For example, in many situations in 
which outcomes would be improved by cooperation, very substantial numbers of people 
(although far from all) find cooperation and reciprocation rewarding and non-
reciprocation sufficiently adverse that they are willing to punish free-riders.  When 
cooperation would provide goods (evaluated as such by nearly all those affected) that 
would not otherwise be provided, these facts about the emotional response and evaluation 
underlie our willingness to require  cooperation from those who do not find cooperation 
rewarding in itself – a requirement that we may be willing to enforce with sanctions. 
Moral requirements have to do, after all, with regulating our common lives together and 
there are very obvious considerations (having to do, e.g. with incentives) for not allowing 
people to evade those requirements simply because they say, even truthfully, that their 
preferences and emotions are such that they do not value conforming to them.   So while 
some particular person, Jones, can   be subject to a requirement (and have a reason) to 
help others even if he does not feel like doing so, in my view it would be a mistake to 
conclude from this observation that recognition of this moral requirement is completely 
independent of any  emotionally mediated evaluation that is widely shared by human 
beings.   
 
7. Conclusion 
 
I have argued that areas commonly identified as involved in emotional processing 
play a central role in moral judgment in neurotypical human beings because such areas 
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contribute causally to the construction of  moral evaluations. The moral judgments that 
humans find appealing or compelling or intuitive reflect features of the operation of such 
areas, and this is so whether the judgments in question are “utilitarian” or 
“deontological”. It is because of the involvement of these areas in moral judgment that 
attempts to derive moral requirements from “reason”, conceived as something totally 
distinct from anything affective and just involving the kind of processing that is operative 
when humans work on logic and mathematics, are likely to be unsuccessful. The way 
forward is not to look for moral requirements that are binding on all rational creatures 
just in virtue of their rationality but rather to recognize that moral requirements that we 
find appealing and that are suitable for regulating our lives will reflect facts about our 
affective and motivational commitments, as well as our capacities for reasoning.  
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